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E-mail address: b.olk@jacobs-university.de (B. OlkAttention may be biased towards faces but a face advantage may be linked to the upright orientation of a
face. Three experiments, employing a ﬂanker and a cuing paradigm, investigated effects of face orienta-
tion, perceptual load and allocation of attention. Experiment 1 demonstrated that, irrespective of load,
attention is biased towards upright face distractors while inverted face distractors are easy to ignore.
Experiment 2 veriﬁed that inverted face distractors can interfere provided that they are attended to voli-
tionally, likely because the volitional allocation of attention promotes face processing and gender classi-
ﬁcation (Experiment 3).
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Faces may attract more attention than other stimuli, although
speciﬁc circumstances matter (see Palermo & Rhodes, 2007 for a
review). An attentional preference for faces is reasonable, consider-
ing the social and biological importance of faces, but the exact con-
ditions under which it occurs are not yet completely clear. Studies
like the work by Lavie, Ro, and Russell (2003) suggested that faces
are impossible to ignore and that face processing may be manda-
tory. In their study, participants searched for a name among one,
two, four, or six letter strings, which were presented in the center
of a display and indicated by key press whether the name was the
name of a politician or a pop star. The central stimuli were ﬂanked
by peripheral famous faces of politicians or pop stars (Experiment
1), which had to be ignored. The ﬂanking distractor faces could
either be the face of the person named (congruent condition) or
the face of a person from the opposite category (incongruent con-
dition). The results showed that participants were slower to
respond in the incongruent condition, providing evidence that
the distractor faces were processed and not ignored. Crucially
though, the distractor faces were also processed when the percep-
tual load in the center was high, i.e., six letter strings or even eight
letter strings were shown (Experiment 3). At such a high load other
meaningful non-face distractors such as fruits or musical instru-
ments are typically not attended to (Experiments 2 and 4), in line
with the perceptual load theory of attention (Lavie, 1995, 2000).ll rights reserved.
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).According to this theory, distractors should not have an effect
because with high perceptual load, e.g., when many relevant stim-
uli are shown, the capacity for the perception of stimuli should be
exhausted and the perception of distractors should be prevented.
When, on the contrary, the perceptual load is low, e.g., when only
one or very few relevant stimuli are shown, spare attentional
capacity ‘leaks to’ the distractors, resulting in attention to and
the perception of the distractors. The ﬁnding that face distractors
were processed even at high perceptual load suggests that faces
might always be prioritized irrespective of the perceptual load
or their relevance for the task at hand, in line with their high
biological and human signiﬁcance.
The special role of faces is in line with further research that
shows that the allocation of attention is biased towards faces and
that irrelevant distractor faces are hard to ignore (Bindemann, Bur-
ton, & Jenkins, 2005; Jenkins, Burton, & Ellis, 2002; Langton, Law,
Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008; Ro, Russell, & Lavie, 2001; Young,
Ellis, Flude, McWeeny, & Hay, 1986). For example, Ro et al. (2001)
showed preferential allocation of attention to faces in a change
detection task, in which one of six upright stimuli containing a face
and other objects (e.g., musical instruments, food, plants) could
change. For instance, a face was replaced by another face. Partici-
pants were faster and more accurate to detect changed faces than
changed objects, showing a clear face advantage. However, when
only one stimulus was presented at a time (Experiment 2a) the face
advantage disappeared. Based on these ﬁndings the authors sug-
gest that a situation of high perceptual load, in which competition
for attention occurs, is crucial for a face advantage to arise. This
ﬁnding is in line with Lavie et al. (2003), even though they used
a different paradigm, because in their study the difference between
face and object stimuli in terms of a congruency effect for faces but
not objects occurred in high load conditions.
1 Following the procedure established by Lavie et al. (2003) we showed stimuli
until response. It could be argued that this could allow serial processing of the target
words and distractor faces. However, as will be shown in the results section for
Experiment 1, congruency effects occurred for upright but not inverted faces,
suggesting that attention was allocated to upright faces. Nevertheless, overall RT did
not differ between orientation conditions, i.e., was not longer for upright faces, not in
line with the idea that target and distractor were processed serially when congruency
effects occurred.
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cation of attention to faces was abolished when six stimuli were
shown in inverted orientation (Experiment 2b). As competition
for attention should also occur within a six-item-display of in-
verted stimuli, the absence of a face advantage indicates that a
competition situation may not be sufﬁcient for a face advantage.
The orientation in which the face is shown may also be important.
A study by Langton et al. (2008), using a visual search task, is point-
ing in the same direction. Participants searched for a butterﬂy
among six distractor stimuli. When one of the distractors was a
face, search was signiﬁcantly slowed. But this effect only occurred
when the stimuli were shown upright. With inverted stimuli
search times were not affected by the presence of an inverted face,
indicating that higher level representations of faces produced the
effect. These ﬁndings from different studies using different para-
digms and tasks suggest two conclusions. First, for the allocation
of attention and attentional resources to be biased towards faces
it is not sufﬁcient that a stimulus is a face and that it is presented
in a competition situation but that it also is presented in upright
orientation. Second, inverted faces, albeit being faces and thus so-
cially and behaviorally relevant stimuli, do not appear to attract
more allocation of attention than objects.
However, a recent study by Bindemann and Burton (2008)
sheds doubt on both conclusions. They showed that more attention
was allocated to inverted faces than objects, in fact as much as to
upright faces. It was investigated how face inversion affects the
allocation of attention to faces in a cuing paradigm. Faces and/or
objects were shown to the left and right of central ﬁxation, fol-
lowed by a target (a gray square) at one of the two locations. Tar-
gets were responded to faster at the location of an inverted face
compared to an inverted object (Experiment 1). This effect shows
that more attention was allocated to inverted faces than to in-
verted objects. In further experiments inverted faces and upright
faces were presented together. Upright faces did not attract more
attention than inverted faces (Experiment 2) because the response
times to targets appearing at the location of upright faces were not
faster. Experiment 3 ruled out that the obtained effects were
merely due to difﬁculties to distinguish upright and inverted faces.
Thus, even though observers could distinguish the faces well, it
was not more likely that attention was allocated to upright faces.
The authors concluded that a face advantage in competition for
attention is not affected by inversion.
There is thus conﬂicting evidence regarding the role of the ori-
entation of a face and a preferential allocation of attention to faces.
Methodological differences between previous studies may be
important. In the studies by Ro et al. (2001) and Langton et al.
(2008) an array of six to seven stimuli was shown, the face or in-
verted face was just one out of these stimuli and the participants
had to perform a task that required them to distinguish the stimuli
from each other. Thus, the perceptual load was high. On the other
hand, Bindemann and Burton (2008) showed only two stimuli at a
time and the task did not require participants to distinguish the
faces from other classes of stimuli but to respond to the target
stimulus following the face presentation (Experiments 1 and 2).
Thus, the perceptual load was low. It is possible that attention allo-
cated to inverted and upright faces may not differ when perceptual
load is low but that an advantage for upright faces is found when
perceptual load is high. Previous studies either included conditions
of low vs. high load and upright faces (Lavie et al., 2003; Ro et al.,
2001), or compared processing of upright and inverted faces under
either low load (Bindemann & Burton, 2008) or high load (Langton
et al., 2008; Ro et al., 2001). Thus, with the motivation to further
examine under which conditions the allocation of attention may
be biased towards faces and whether attention enhances the pro-
cessing of inverted faces we manipulated load, face orientation
and the allocation of attention in the present experiments.2. Experiment 1
Experiment 1 fully crossed the two factors perceptual load and
face orientation and investigated whether attention is biased to-
wards upright and inverted faces under low and under high load
to a comparable degree. Interference effects of upright and in-
verted faces were assessed under varying load in a ﬂanker para-
digm similar to Lavie et al. (2003). Based on the previous work
outlined in the introduction, it is expected that upright and in-
verted faces would both attract attention and lead to congruency
effects under low load but that under high load only upright faces
would interfere.2.1. Material and methods
2.1.1. Participants
Thirty-two undergraduate university students (25 female, 7
male; ages 18–22) gave informed consent and received course
credit for taking part in the study. Sixteen participants took part
in Condition ‘Upright’ and 16 participants took part in Condition
‘Inverted’. All had normal or corrected vision. The experiment
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.2.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
The procedure of the experiment was modeled after the study
by Lavie et al. (2003). At the beginning of each trial a central ﬁxa-
tion cross (0.5  0.5) was shown for 500 ms, followed by the pre-
sentation of a central array of letter strings, consisting of a name of
an actor or actress and either one, three or ﬁve additional nonword
letter strings (4–5 in length by 1.2, 2.5 or 3.8 in height, depend-
ing on set size). To the left or right of the central array (3.5 dis-
tance between inner edge of the picture and the central array) a
grayscale picture (3.15  4.55) of a smiling male or female ac-
tor/actress (one out of six male and six female pictures; front view)
was presented. The central array and distractor were presented un-
til participants responded.1 Like established in previous studies (i.e.,
Jenkins, Lavie, & Driver, 2003; Lavie et al., 2003) the distractor could
either be the face of the person named (congruent condition) or the
face of a person from the opposite category (incongruent condition,
see Fig. 1). In one condition the face distractor was presented up-
right, in the other condition inverted. The location of the distractor
and its gender were equally frequent and randomized. The same
stimuli were used and the same procedure followed for both condi-
tions so that potentially different results between the conditions
would not be due to speciﬁcs of the stimuli used. Using the same
stimuli also necessitated that face orientation was manipulated
between subjects. Each condition consisted of 432 trials, preceded
by 29 practice trials. The experiment was run with Superlab (Cedrus)
software.
Participants were provided with written instructions, which in-
formed them to ﬁnd the name in the center of the screen and to
indicate whether it belongs to a man or a woman by pressing
one of two respective response buttons on the keyboard (‘Q’ for
‘woman’ and ‘P’ for ‘man’). The reason for using a gender classiﬁca-
tion task was to assess whether the effects reported by Lavie et al.
(2003) for upright faces would be replicated with a different type
of task. Participants were instructed to respond as fast as possible
+500 ms
Fig. 1. Example display of Experiments 1 and 2 depicting a trial with an inverted,
incongruent, male distractor face and a set size of six items. Stimuli are not drawn
to scale.
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Fig. 2. Mean reaction times in milliseconds (ms) in trials with congruent and
incongruent upright (on the left) and inverted (on the right) face distractors,
separately for the different set sizes, for Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard
errors.
2 As part of another set of experiments, we used the same procedure and set sizes
as here but used upright objects (fruit and musical instruments) as ﬂanker and
obtained, consistent with the literature, signiﬁcant main effects of congruency,
F(1, 8) = 9.2, p < 0.02, and set size, F(2, 16) = 210.4, p < 0.001, as well as an interaction
between set size and congruency, F(1, 16) = 3.9, p < 0.05. Object ﬂankers interfered
signiﬁcantly at a set size of two, t(8) = 3.1, p < 0.02, showed a trend at set size four,
t(8) = 2.2, p = 0.06, and showed no congruency effect at set size six, t(8) = 0.05,
p = 0.97. These results underline the fact that the manipulation of perceptual load was
effective and an absence of an interaction between congruency  set size for upright
face stimuli is not due to methodological reasons.
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plays are shown in Fig. 1.
2.2. Results
Trials with reaction times (RT) below 200 ms and above two
standard deviations (SD) of the mean of a given participant were
treated as outliers and removed before data analysis. In a next step,
mean RT of correct responses were calculated for each participant
and submitted to an ANOVA with the within-factors congruency
(congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6) and the
between-factor orientation (upright vs. inverted).
The ANOVA returned signiﬁcant main effects of set size and
congruency as well as an interaction between congruency  orien-
tation. Reaction time increased with set size, F(2, 60) = 692.6,
p < 0.001, g2p = 0.958, showing that perceptual load was modulated
effectively. With respect to a congruency effect, participants re-
sponded more slowly in incongruent compared to congruent trials,
F(1, 30) = 30.6, p < 0.001, g2p = 0.51. The congruency effect was
modulated by orientation, as indicated by an interaction between
congruency  orientation, F(1, 30) = 10.9, p < 0.005, g2p = 0.267. To
further assess the nature of this interaction, two separate ANOVAs,
one for each face orientation condition, with the factors congru-
ency and set size were carried out. When the face distractors were
presented upright, main effects of congruency, F(1, 15) = 41.8,
p < 0.001, g2p = 0.736, and of set size, F(2, 30) = 447.8, p < 0.001,
g2p = 0.968, occurred. The interaction was not signiﬁcant,
F(2, 30) = 0.5, p = 0.621, g2p = 0.031, indicating that congruency
effects occurred and the face distractors interfered, irrespective
of set size. Paired-samples t-tests conﬁrmed a congruency effect
for each set size (set size 2: t(15) = 6.09, p < 0.001, d = 1.52; set size
4: t(15) = 3.853, p < 0.003, d = 0.96; set size 6: t(15) = 2.436,
p < 0.03, d = 0.61). When the irrelevant face distractors were pre-
sented inverted, only a main effect of set size, F(2, 30) = 277.8,
p < 0.001, g2p = 0.949, but no congruency effect, F(1, 15) = 2.3,
p = 0.149, g2p = 0.134, and no interaction, F(2, 30) = 0.01, p = 0.989,
g2p = 0.001, were present. The lack of a congruency effect for each
set size was conﬁrmed by paired-samples t-tests (set size 2:
t(15) = 1.714, p = 0.107, d = 0.43; set size 4: t(15) = 0.671,
p = 0.512, d = 0.17; set size 6: t(15) = 0.895, p = 0.385, d = 0.22).
The results are illustrated in Fig. 2.
Error rates were low (3–7%) and an ANOVA with the within-fac-
tors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6)
and the between-factor orientation (upright vs. inverted) did not
return any signiﬁcant effects on error rates.2.3. Discussion
The results for upright faces replicate Lavie et al. (2003) and
extend their results to a gender classiﬁcation task, showing con-
gruency effects regardless of perceptual load.2 The congruency ef-
fects are also in line with Bindemann et al. (2005) who showed
interference effects of distractor faces on name categorization in a
gender classiﬁcation task.
In accordance with the general expectation, the congruency ef-
fects differed between upright and inverted faces. Surprisingly
though, inverted faces did not produce any congruency effect at
all, not even under low load. The lack of a congruency effect for in-
verted faces cannot be explained by low-level factors such as com-
plexity, brightness, contrast and conﬁgural properties because
inverted faces are identical to upright faces with respect to these
factors (Valentine, 1988). A potential explanation for the lack of a
congruency effect may be that upright faces do not require atten-
tion to be processed but inverted faces do. However, if this was
the case then interference effects should occur for inverted faces
at least with low perceptual load because under low load attention
should ‘spill over’ to the distractor. However, no interference
effects were found for inverted faces at low load.
The ﬁnding that inverted faces would not attract attention un-
der low perceptual load is also surprising, considering that Binde-
mann and Burton (2008) have shown that inverted faces can
attract attention. However, the discrepancy between the present
ﬁnding and their study can be explained by vast differences
between the experimental procedures. First, in the study by Binde-
mann and Burton (2008) a gray square had to be detected and in
the present experiment gender classiﬁcation was required. If atten-
tion is also biased towards inverted faces then the allocated atten-
tional resources may be sufﬁcient to promote the detection of
simple stimuli but not for stimulus discrimination. Also, in the
Bindemann and Burton (2008) study the two cues, e.g., upright
face/inverted face, competed with each other but did not compete
with the target stimulus that was shown after the cue. It is thus
possible that when two faces (upright and inverted) are shown
together, that attention may be allocated to both stimuli. In the
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strings and importantly, participants were instructed to ignore
the distractor faces and to focus their attention on the centrally
presented items. In Bindemann and Burton’s study the faces were
used as nonpredictive peripheral cues (Experiments 1 and 2) that
appeared at a location where a target item could appear. Partici-
pants did not receive instructions with respect to the cues, thus,
they were not told to ignore them. And importantly, because the
target could appear at the locations where the cues were shown,
the allocation of attention to those locations is functional and use-
ful. Considering these differences between the studies, it is very
possible that a lack of a congruency effect for inverted faces in
the present experiment signiﬁes that inverted faces are easy to
ignore when participants try to do so.
However, before accepting this explanation, an alternative
explanation should be considered, namely, that it could also be
the case that inverted faces are in fact attended to but simply do
not produce congruency effects in the present paradigm. The goal
of Experiment 2 was to test this hypothesis.3. Experiment 2
To test whether inverted faces can lead to congruency effects at
all in the present paradigm and whether no congruency effects oc-
curred for inverted faces in Experiment 1 because participants suc-
cessfully ignored the inverted face distractors, participants were
now explicitly instructed to allocate attention to the distractor
faces. To motivate them to do so, they were informed that they
would have to complete a simple face recognition task after the ini-
tial experiment. If the lack of a congruency effect for inverted faces
in Experiment 1 is unrelated to the allocation of attention, i.e., if in-
verted faces do in general not lead to congruency effects in this
paradigm, then no congruency effect should be observed in the
present experiment either. If the allocation of attention does medi-
ate congruency effects for inverted faces though, then a congru-
ency effect with slower/less accurate responses should occur for
inverted as well as upright face stimuli.3.1. Material and methods
3.1.1. Participants
Twenty-three undergraduate university students (12 female, 11
male; ages 18–22) gave informed consent and received course
credit for taking part in the study. Eleven participants took part
in Condition ‘Upright’ and 12 participants took part in Condition
‘Inverted’. All had normal or corrected vision. The experiment
was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.500
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Fig. 3. Mean reaction times in milliseconds (ms) in trials with congruent and
incongruent upright (on the left) and inverted (on the right) face distractors,
separately for the different set sizes, for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard
errors.3.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
The experiment consisted of 288 trials. The stimuli and proce-
dure were identical to Experiment 1 with the only exception that
participants were instructed to pay attention to the distractor
faces. They were informed that at the end of the experiment they
would be asked some questions about the pictures. To fulﬁl this
expectation, participants completed eight trials of a face recogni-
tion task after the experiment. On each trial of this additional
task, a face of a man or woman who had been presented before
or not was shown in upright or inverted orientation and partici-
pants had to indicate whether this person’s picture had been
shown during the experiment and to respond by button press.
As the purpose of this test was only to fulﬁl the expectation of
a further test and contained only very few trials, it will not be
considered further.3.2. Results
Trials with RT below 200 ms or above two SD of the mean of a
given participant were considered as outliers and removed. Mean
RT of correct responses was calculated for each participant and
submitted to an ANOVA with the within-factors congruency (con-
gruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6) and the between-fac-
tor orientation (upright vs. inverted). Reaction times increased
with set size, F(2, 42) = 484.5, p < 0.001, g2p = 0.958, and a congru-
ency effect occurred, F(1, 21) = 23.1, p < 0.001, g2p = 0.524. The con-
gruency effect was not modulated by orientation because the
interaction between congruency  orientation was not signiﬁcant,
F(1, 21) = 0.163, p = .691, g2p = 0.008. No further signiﬁcant effects
occurred. The congruency effects for each orientation condition
were conﬁrmed by two ANOVAs that were carried out separately
for each orientation (upright: F(1, 10) = 15.9, p < 0.005, g2p = 0.614;
inverted: F(1, 11) = 8.7, p < 0.01, g2p = 0.441). Similarly, the set size
effects (upright: F(2, 20) = 386.9, p < .001, g2p = 0.975; inverted:
F(2, 22) = 191.9, p < .001, g2p = 0.946) and a lack of an interaction
between congruency  set size (upright: F(2, 20) = 0.814,
p = 0.457, g2p = 0.075; inverted: F(2, 22) = 0.06, p = 0.944,
g2p = 0.005) were conﬁrmed for each orientation. The results are
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Error rates were low (2–6%) and an ANOVA with the within-fac-
tors congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6)
and the between-factor orientation (upright vs. inverted) returned
only a marginally signiﬁcant effect for set size, F(2, 42) = 3.2,
p = 0.052, g2p = 0.132. Paired t-tests showed that participants made
fewer errors with set size 4 than set size 2, t(22) = 2.083, p < 0.05,
d = 0.43. No other comparisons were signiﬁcant.
In order to compare the RT effects for upright and for inverted
faces between Experiment 1 and 2, two further ANOVAs, one for
each orientation, with the within-factors congruency (congruent
vs. incongruent) and set size (2, 4, 6) and the between-factor
experiment (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2) were conducted. For
upright faces the main effect of congruency, F(1, 25) = 50.1,
p < 0.001, g2p = 0.667, and the main effect of set size,
F(2, 50) = 806.7, p < 0.001, g2p = 0.970, were conﬁrmed. Neither
main effect differed between experiments (congruency  experi-
ment: F(1, 25), 0.476, p = 0.497, g2p = 0.019; set size  experiment:
F(2, 50) = 0.865, p = 0.427, g2p = 0.033; congruency  set
size  experiment: F(2, 50) = 0.434, p = 0.651, g2p = 0.017). Partici-
pants responded more slowly in Experiment 2 than in Experiment
1, F(1, 25) = 12.6, p < 0.005, g2p = 0.336.
For inverted faces a main effect of congruency, F(1, 26) = 12.9,
p < 0.002, g2p = 0.332, was found, which was, importantly,
modulated by experiment, F(1, 26) = 4.8, p < 0.05, g2p = 0.154, in line
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2 but not Experiment 1. Set size showed a signiﬁcant main effect,
F(2, 52) = 464.8, p < 0.001, g2p = 0.947, conﬁrming the results of
the previous analyses. Participants responded more slowly in
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, F(1, 26) = 13.4, p < 0.002,
g2p = 0.339. No further effects were signiﬁcant.
3.3. Discussion
The results are unequivocal. A congruency effect occurred for
upright and for inverted faces, showing that inverted faces can pro-
duce congruency effects in the present paradigm. Thus, the results
rule out the concern that inverted faces, in general, do not produce
congruency effects. Comparing the results of Experiment 1 and 2, it
is apparent that the volitional allocation of attention was critical
for congruency effects to occur for inverted faces.
Interestingly, the congruency effects for upright and inverted
faces in Experiment 2 were of the same extent. Thus, although in-
verted faces are typically harder to recognize (Valentine, 1988), the
gender of the faces must have been recognized sufﬁciently in the
inverted condition in order to produce effects. In fact, distractor
interference and resulting congruency effects necessitate the
extraction of gender-related information from the peripheral faces.
Because congruency effects occurred in Experiment 2 but not
Experiment 1, it seems to be important that attention is allocated
to an inverted face in order for the gender to be processed and
classiﬁed.
The comparison between experiments revealed that for upright
faces the congruency effect did not grow larger. This ﬁnding may
show that attention biased towards the upright face distractors
in Experiment 1 was sufﬁcient to process the faces to the extent
that the gender of the face interfered and further allocation of voli-
tional attention is not required and does not enhance congruency
effects for upright faces.
The comparison between experiments also showed that partic-
ipants responded more slowly in Experiment 2 than in Experiment
1. This outcome is not surprising, considering that in addition to
judging the centrally presented name a second task (‘pay attention
to the face’) was instructed. However, it could be argued that be-
cause it took participants more time to provide the response in
Experiment 2, this extra time may have supported processing of
the inverted faces and hence gender classiﬁcation. While time allo-
cated to stimuli may well go hand in hand with more accurate pro-
cessing, it has to be considered that, as in the study by Lavie et al.
(2003), in both experiments the stimuli were presented until
participants responded. Thus, participants were free to take more
time in Experiment 1 as well and to process the inverted faces.
However, it appears that they did not do so but succeeded to ignore
them.3
In sum, Experiment 2 showed that inverted face distractors can
lead to congruency effects, provided that attention is volitionally
allocated to them. One way in which the volitional allocation of
attention may mediate congruency effects with inverted face dis-
tractors is by facilitating the processing of inverted faces and hence
facilitating gender classiﬁcation. Attention serves to enhance pro-
cessing of stimuli and this has been shown for upright faces using
cuing procedures (Esterman et al., 2008; Landau, Esterman, Robert-3 To further investigate this issue, we determined the six fastest and the six slowest
participants in the inverted face condition in Experiment 2 and compared their
results. Importantly, the ‘fast’ group was signiﬁcantly faster than the ‘slow’ group,
F(1, 10) = 24.95, p < 0.002. The RT difference between the ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ group was
on average 213 ms. The typical main effects of congruency, F(1, 10) = 8.4, p < 0.02, and
of set size, F(1, 20) = 194.1, p < 0.001, were conﬁrmed. However, none of the
interactions reached signiﬁcance, and importantly, the interaction between congru-
ency  speed was thus not signiﬁcant, p = .46. This result indicates that longer RTs are
not associated with larger congruency effects.son, Bentin, & Prinzmetal, 2007). To assess whether this is true for
inverted faces as well and whether the allocation of attention pro-
motes gender classiﬁcation of inverted faces, and hence could have
promoted congruency effects in Experiment 2, is the goal of Exper-
iment 3. Experiment 3 was conducted based on the outcome of
Experiment 2.4. Experiment 3
One prototypical paradigm to investigate the effects of voli-
tional attention is the cuing paradigm (e.g., Posner, Walker, Fried-
rich, & Rafal, 1984), in which participants are provided with a cue
that predicts the location of an upcoming target stimulus. Partici-
pants are encouraged to expect the target at the cued location
and to strategically and volitionally direct their attention following
the cue. Typically, participants are faster to respond to the target
when it appears at the cued location, indicating that the allocation
of attention facilitated the task-at-hand. If attention had no impact,
no cuing effect should be observed.
Studies applying the cuing paradigm have shown that the allo-
cation of attention improved the processing of upright face targets.
For instance, in the experiments by Esterman et al. (2008) and Lan-
dau et al. (2007) the discrimination of upright faces was faster
when the face appeared at the cued compared to the noncued loca-
tion. The obtained cuing effect reﬂects that the allocation of atten-
tion on the stimulus face was beneﬁcial. Landau et al. (2007)
showed that the cuing beneﬁt was larger when attention was di-
rected volitionally by cues that predict the target location com-
pared to a condition in which attention was directed only
involuntarily by cues that are nonpredictive of target location, in
agreement with a wealth of cuing studies which showed larger cu-
ing effects with predictive compared to nonpredictive cues using
other targets (e.g., Olk, Cameron, & Kingstone, 2008; Ristic & King-
stone, 2006). Imaging studies are in line with such ﬁndings as well
and have shown larger responses in the fusiform face area (FFA)
when faces are attended compared to unattended (e.g., Wojciulik,
Kanwisher, & Driver, 1998), in particular when attention is directed
voluntarily (Esterman et al., 2008). An enhanced response in the
FFA can be interpreted as perceptual enhancement of the stimuli,
suggesting that the allocation of attention on the stimuli supports
their processing.
It is undisputed that inverted faces are harder to identify than
upright faces, possibly because inversion affects the conﬁgural pro-
cessing of faces (Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000; for a review see
Maurer, Le Grand, & Mondloch, 2002) and may produce a subtle
but consistent shift in observers’ spatial-sampling strategies (Sek-
uler, Gaspar, Gold, & Bennett, 2004). Generally, it has also been
shown that it takes longer to categorize inverted than upright faces
(Donnelly, Humphreys, & Sawyer, 1994) and this ﬁnding also
applies to gender classiﬁcation tasks (Aguado, Garcia-Gutierrez, &
Serrano-Pedraza, 2009; Sergent & Corballis, 1989). It has been pro-
posed that the eye–eyebrow region is the most important part for
gender discrimination (Burton, Bruce, & Dench, 1993; Dupuis-Roy,
Fortin, Fiset, & Gosselin, 2009) and it is possible that inversion may
hinder the processing of such an area. As attention facilitates pro-
cessing, we propose that attention may also facilitate the process-
ing of inverted faces and hence gender classiﬁcation of inverted
faces.
Consequently, the goal of Experiment 3 was to test whether the
volitional allocation of attention would promote processing of in-
verted faces and thereby facilitate gender classiﬁcation. To this
end, we used a different paradigm than in the ﬁrst two experi-
ments and switched to the cuing paradigm. Participants were cued
with predictive cues and encouraged to volitionally shift their
attention in the direction of the cue before the gender classiﬁcation
Fig. 4. Example displays of Experiment 3 depicting (a) a trial of the ‘No Cue’
condition, showing an inverted, female face; (b) a trial of the ‘Cuing’ condition,
showing an upright, male face. Stimuli are not drawn to scale.
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informed that in most trials the to be judged face would appear
at the cued location. It was expected that gender classiﬁcation of
inverted faces would be faster and more accurate when the face
appeared at a cued compared to a noncued location. In order to
place the experiment in the context of previously reported cuing
effects for faces and to ensure that any potential absence of cuing
effects for inverted faces (although unexpected) would not be due
to methodological aspects, we also included trials in which upright
faces were used as targets. For upright face targets, cuing effects
are expected, in line with previous work. Whether cuing would
facilitate face processing to the same extent for upright and in-
verted faces was an open question. On the one hand, it could be ex-
pected that inverted faces may beneﬁt more from cues than
upright faces because they are harder to process and classify. Also,
responses to inverted faces may be given more slowly. Alterna-
tively, it is possible that the effects between upright and inverted
faces do not differ. In a control condition (‘No cue’) participants
simply judged the gender of a peripherally presented face to
establish that gender classiﬁcation of the presented stimuli is
slower and less accurate for inverted faces.500
550
600
650
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Condition and Validity
R
ea
ct
io
n 
tim
Fig. 5. Mean reaction times in milliseconds (ms) in Experiment 3 in trials with
upright and inverted face stimuli, separately for the ‘No Cue’ (on the left) and for the
‘Cuing’ (on the right) conditions. Error bars represent standard errors.4.1. Material and methods
4.1.1. Participants
Thirty undergraduate university students (21 female, 9 male;
ages 18–22) gave informed consent and received course credit
for taking part in the study. Fifteen participants took part in Condi-
tion ‘Cuing’ and 15 participants took part in Condition ‘No cue’. All
had normal or corrected vision. The experiment was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.4.1.2. Stimuli and procedure
The experiment consisted of two conditions. In both conditions,
the ‘No Cue’ and the ‘Cuing’ condition, a horizontal line (2.5) was
presented in the center of the screen and participants were in-
structed to ﬁxate this line throughout a trial. After 1000 ms, in
the ‘No Cue’ condition a picture of a face (5.8  6.7) was added
and presented 2 to the left or to the right of the line, in random-
ized order. The pictures contained photographs of unfamiliar fe-
male and male faces as classiﬁcation of familiar faces may prove
too easy for the purpose of the present experiment. Further, images
were cut to conceal most of the hair. Participants were instructed
to determine the gender of the presented person and to press
one of two designated response keys, labeled with ‘WOMAN’ or
‘MAN’ on a Cedrus RB-530 response box as fast as possible. The dis-
play was presented for 1000 ms.
In the ‘Cuing’ condition the central horizontal line was changed
into an arrow cue by adding ﬁns to both sides of the line. The cue
pointed in the direction at which the picture was going to appear
(valid cue) in 66% of the trials and in the opposite direction (inva-
lid cue) in 33% of the trials. As effects of voluntary orienting in-
crease with the time between cue and target, we chose a
reasonably long stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 800 ms to al-
low sufﬁcient time to allocate attention voluntarily. Thus, after
800 ms the same pictures as in the ‘No Cue’ condition were shown
to the left or right of the arrow, in randomized order, for a further
1000 ms. Participants were informed of cue validity and encour-
aged to use the cue.
Each condition, ‘No Cue’ and ‘Cuing’, consisted of two blocks of
240 trials each, preceded by 12 practice trials. In one of the blocks
participants were presented with upright faces, in the other block
with inverted faces, with half of the participants starting with up-
right and half with inverted faces. For each block, the stimuli were
selected from a pool of twenty female and twenty male faces. Thefaces used in both blocks differed. Example displays and procedure
are illustrated in Fig. 4.
4.2. Results
Trials with RT below 200 ms or above two SD of the mean of
each given participant were removed.
In the ‘No cue’ condition mean RT of correct responses was com-
pared between trials with upright and trials with inverted faces
and showed that responses were given signiﬁcantly faster in the
upright condition, t(14) = 6.71, p < .001, d = 1.73. The comparison
between error rates in trials with upright (2.9%) and inverted faces
(6.4%) also showed an effect of orientation, with fewer errors when
faces were presented upright, t(14) = 4.8, p < .001, d = 1.23.
Mean RT of correct responses in the ‘Cuing’ condition were com-
pared with an ANOVA with the within-factors orientation (upright
vs. inverted) and cue validity (valid vs. invalid). The ANOVA re-
turned signiﬁcant main effects of orientation and of validity. Gen-
der was classiﬁed faster for upright faces, F(1, 14) = 65.9, p < .001,
g2p = 0.825, and when valid cues predicted the face,
F(1, 14) = 50.5, p < .001, g2p = 0.783. The interaction was not signiﬁ-
cant, F(1, 14) = 1.384, p = 0.26, g2p = 0.090. Paired-sample t-tests
conﬁrmed signiﬁcant cuing effects between valid and invalid trials
in the ‘Cuing’ condition for both orientations (upright: t(14) = 6.26,
p < 0.001, d = 1.62, inverted: t(14) = 6.86, p < 0.001, d = 1.77. The re-
sults are illustrated in Fig. 5.
The analysis of error rates for the ‘Cuing’ condition, considering
orientation (upright vs. inverted) and cue validity (valid vs. inva-
lid), showed that faces were discriminated more accurately when
shown upright (3%) than inverted (6.2%), F(1, 14) = 9.5, p < 0.01,
g2p = 0.404. No further effects were signiﬁcant. Error rates were
generally relatively low.
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The results in the ‘No cue’ condition established that partici-
pants were signiﬁcantly slower and less accurate at judging gender
for the inverted face stimuli used in the experiment, conﬁrming
that inverted faces are harder to classify than upright faces (Agu-
ado et al., 2009; Sergent & Corballis, 1989). The ‘Cuing’ condition
supported this result. Here participants were also slower and less
accurate to respond when an inverted face had to be judged.
For faces shown in both orientations, participants signiﬁcantly
beneﬁtted from valid cues. The response was given faster when
attention had initially been allocated towards the location at which
a face stimulus was likely to appear. The cuing effects were of the
same extent for upright and inverted faces, even though inverted
faces are harder to classify, as indicated by slower response times.
The experiment thus suggests that the allocation of attention pro-
moted processing of inverted faces and facilitated gender classiﬁ-
cation, in line with imaging and electrophysiological studies (e.g.,
Eimer, 2000; Esterman et al., 2008; Wojciulik et al., 1998). The
ﬁnding of a cuing effect also for inverted faces suggests that in
Experiment 2 the volitional directing of attention towards the in-
verted face likely facilitated processing and classiﬁcation of faces
and that in turn the inverted faces interfered with incongruent
central targets.4 In Experiment 1 no attention or possibly not
enough attention was directed to the inverted face for gender
classiﬁcation.5. General discussion
We conducted three experiments to investigate under which
conditions attention may be biased towards faces and whether
the allocation of attention enhances processing of inverted faces.
A particular focus was on face orientation, perceptual load and
the effect of the volitional allocation of attention.
Noticing the conﬂicting evidence whether attention is biased
towards inverted faces like towards upright faces, we asked
whether the consideration of perceptual load may resolve this is-
sue. More speciﬁcally, in Experiment 1 we hypothesized that the
orientation of a face may not matter when load is low, i.e., atten-
tion may be biased towards inverted faces as much as towards up-
right faces, but when perceptual load is high attention may only be
allocated to upright faces. Experiment 1 did not conﬁrm this
hypothesis. When faces were shown upright, congruency effects
occurred, in line with the literature. No congruency effects were
observed for inverted faces, irrespective of load, suggesting that
attention was not biased towards inverted faces and that it was
in fact easy for participants to ignore faces when they are in-
verted.5 Experiment 2 ruled out that this lack of congruency effects
for inverted faces was due to an inability of inverted faces to produce
congruency effects in the applied paradigm per se. When participants
had to allocate attention to the faces in Experiment 2, signiﬁcant
congruency effects occurred also for inverted faces. Experiments 1
and 2 thus allow the conclusion that the orientation of a face clearly4 Gender classiﬁcation of the faces used in Experiments 1 and 2 was possibly easier
than in Experiment 3 because in Experiment 3 unfamiliar faces were chosen. While it
is theoretically possible that attention effects may be smaller for faces that are easier
to classify, the results of Experiment 3 do not support this idea. Upright faces were
clearly easier to classify because participants responded faster and more accurately
than for inverted faces. The cuing effect was of the same extent in both orientation
conditions, however.
5 The interpretation that inverted faces were easy to ignore does not imply per se
that no attention/attentional resources at all were allocated to them. It remains
possible that some attention was allocated to the inverted faces in Experiment 1,
however, not sufﬁcient to produce interference effects, and further work may wish to
investigate whether inverting faces only reduces but not completely abolishes
allocation of attention in the given paradigm.affects whether attention will be biased towards a face. In line with
Lavie et al. (2003) upright faces were always prioritized, irrespective
of the perceptual load. For inverted faces there was no direct evi-
dence that participants attended to them, suggesting that they were
easy to ignore, regardless of the load, in Experiment 1, thus inverting
faces at least reduces attention-biasing power.
This conclusion is consistent with a recent study by Devue,
Laloyaux, Feyers, Theeuwes, and Bredart (2009) and also Gilchrist
and Proske (2006). Devue et al. (2009) showed that upright but
not inverted face stimuli were more resistant to inattentional
blindness. They interpret their ﬁndings as showing that upright
faces are more likely to grab attention than other objects or in-
verted faces. Gilchrist and Proske (2006) examined eye movements
towards and away from upright and inverted faces and showed
that when participants had to look away from the peripheral face
stimuli, i.e., make an antisaccade, they made less erroneous sac-
cades towards a peripheral face stimulus when they had to look
away from an inverted face than from an upright face. This may
suggest that inverted faces attracted attention and the eyes to a
lesser extent (even though participants still had to attend to the in-
verted face because it was task-relevant as the task was to look
away from the stimulus). Importantly, our results do not need to
imply that inverted faces will never attract attention (see Binde-
mann & Burton, 2008). But when participants are instructed to
ignore inverted faces, it is easier for them to do so than for upright
faces.
Our ﬁnding that inverted faces were easy to ignore is also in line
with Jenkins et al. (2003). The basic task in their set of experiments
was the classiﬁcation of a centrally presented name of a pop star or
a politician while ignoring a famous distractor face (depicting a
pop star or a politician). In the different experiments and condi-
tions either only one distractor face was present, or the distractor
face together with either a phase-shifted face, an intact face, an in-
verted face or an object (Experiments 1–3). Interference effects by
the famous face were reduced when another upright intact face
was presented but not when the other stimuli, including an in-
verted face, served as additional distractors. The authors interpret
their ﬁndings that face processing may be automatic when a single
famous face is presented but that face processing is not completely
capacity-free and the capacity limit may be face-speciﬁc. The study
also suggests that upright faces may be strong competitors for
attention. Such conclusions are in line with our ﬁndings.
The comparison between Experiments 1 and 2 shows that the
allocation of attention is crucial to elicit congruency effects for in-
verted face distractors. A possible way in which the allocation of
attention may achieve this is by enhancing processing of inverted
faces. Experiment 3 thus went one step further and tested whether
the allocation of attention to an inverted face will facilitate process-
ing. The experiment conﬁrmed that it is harder to classify the gen-
der of an inverted than of an upright face, but that the allocation of
attention facilitates processing of the inverted faces. This ﬁnding
suggests that in Experiment 2 the allocation of attention also likely
facilitated the processing of the faces and gender classiﬁcation and
hence congruency effects occurred also for inverted faces.
It had been shown before that attention facilitates processing of
upright faces (e.g., Esterman et al., 2008) and our study now
showed that this is true for inverted faces as well. A question that
arises is why volitional attention did not further enhance congru-
ency effects in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1, in
particular considering that volitional attention does also support
processing of upright faces, as indicated by cuing effects in Exper-
iment 3. A likely explanation is that even though volitional atten-
tion promotes processing of upright faces, this enhanced
processing is not required for congruency effects. In other words,
the attention biased involuntarily towards upright faces is sufﬁ-
cient for gender classiﬁcation.
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factors face orientation and perceptual load in a ﬂanker task.
Experiment 3 is the ﬁrst one that used inverted faces as targets
in a cuing task. Therefore, we consider our results as a ﬁrst step
in a series of further experiments that would be fostered by our re-
search.6 For instance, a question to be investigated could be whether
inverted faces were easier to ignore because they are harder to pro-
cess. In a future experiment upright ﬂanker faces could be shown
normally or degraded in order to manipulate how hard they are to
process. A lack of or a reduced congruency effect in the degraded
condition would indicate that difﬁculty of processing may be crucial.
A further difference between upright and inverted faces may be that
inverted faces are perceived as less ‘‘meaningful’’ and hence are
easier to ignore. Testing this possibility will thus also be of interest.
In our Experiments 1 and 2, we used famous faces, in line with
previous studies. However, it cannot be ruled out that the matching
identity of the face stimulus and the name to be judged in congruent
trials may play a role, e.g., whether it promotes the congruency effect
for upright faces. To this end, Experiments 1 and 2 could be repeated
using unfamiliar faces.
In our Experiments 1 and 2 we showed upright and inverted
faces between groups of participants. Our reasons for doing so
were to show all participants exactly the same stimuli for upright
and inverted faces to rule out that different results for upright and
inverted faces may be due to differences in the stimuli rather than
their orientation. This necessitated to test between groups. As
there is no reason to believe that there was any fundamental dif-
ference between the groups for processing faces as both groups
were of a similar age and background, we believe that our method-
ology is warranted, also in light of past studies that have compared
performance between groups and experiments (e.g., Lavie et al.,
2003). Further, we aimed at avoiding any potential order effects
between upright and inverted trials, e.g., participants who had
seen a given face in upright orientation would then process the
face differently when seen inverted and vice versa. However, it
would be an interesting research question whether randomizing
trials with upright and inverted face distractors would affect how
upright faces attract attention and how easily inverted faces are ig-
nored and whether any effects would interact with load. On the
one hand, it could be expected that inverted faces should still be
easier to ignore when randomized with upright faces. On the other
hand, inter-trial effects could occur. For instance, it could be possi-
ble that an upright face on trial N may interfere less when an in-
verted face was shown on the previous trial N  1, and similarly,
an upright face on trial N  1 may bias attention to an inverted face
on trial N.
6. Conclusions
Our study allows us to conclude that attention is biased towards
faces, irrespective of perceptual load, but that face orientation is
critical. Inverted faces are easier to ignore when participants try
to do so, irrespective of perceptual load. Furthermore, the alloca-
tion of attention enhances face processing and gender classiﬁcation
to the same extent for upright and inverted faces.
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